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My purpose in this essay is to outline a theory of the ontological 
basis oflove by postulating a structure ofinter-subjectivity which might be 
compatible with the ontology established by Jean-Paul Sartre in Being and 
Nothingness. It is futile to believe that inter-subjectivity-which Sanre 
rejects-could simply be appended to his analysis. The implications ofany 
such possibility must be worked out elsewhere. Sanre's account oflove is 
inadequate, however, without this possibility. My discussion-which 
considers love to be a paradigm case of inter-subjectivity or being-with-­
is intended to show three things: first, why inter-subjectivity is necessary to 
the concept oflove; second, what an alternative to Sanre's analysis would 
look like; and third, why the theory carmot be immediately dismissed by 
Sanre's ontology. For the purposes of this essay, the explicit treatment of 
Sanre's analysis of love must be all too brief. 
According to Sartre, "love has for its ideal the appropriation of the 
Other qua Other (Le., as a subjectivity which is looking at an object)," and 
"this ideal can be projected only in terms of my encounter with the Olhcr­
as-subject, not with the Other-as-object" (BN: 488), This forrnulationofthe 
project "to love" is acceptable, for it in itself does not claim that love is nOl 
a project ofinter-subjectivity. But according to the ontological condition of 
for-others, to engage "this concrete Other as an absolute reality" means that 
the only possible relation between the lover and the beloved is the lover's 
being-as-object (BN: 476). In Sartre's analysis, the project has an internal 
contradiction: each lover wants the beloved to maintain herself as pure 
subjectivity in confronting the lover, but as soon as the beloved confronts the 
lover, she experiences the lover's being-as-subject and assumes her objcct­
state. 
Because the only mode of relation between the lover and the 
beloved is the lover's being-as.:.object, the project to love becomes "the 
project of making oneself be loved" (EN: 488), Since the beloved's 
freedom is the foundation of the lover's alienated self, this leaves the lover 
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suspendedin radical contingency. The lover. therefore. desires the beloved's 
freedom "first and foremost" to choose the lover as the a priori objective 
limit to her transcendence (EN: 482). The lover's part in this relation is to 
fully assume his object state. The relation between them would then be 
"closed and secured" in the form of the For-itself-In-itself. 
The beloved. however, "is a look," and as such cannot "employ 
[her] transcendence to fix an ultimate limit to [her] surpassings, norcan [she] 
employ [herl freedom to captivate itself' (EN: 484). As a result, there 
occurs "the lover's perpetual dissatisfaction" (BN: 491). Even in fully 
assuming his object-state. the lover still faces the reality ofbeing surpassed 
for other objects in the world. A pledge of love by the beloved does not 
satisfy the lover since it is not a real engagement of the beloved's freedom. 
What we need to understand from this situation is the futility, the 
actual absurdity, of "making amove" towards the Other. I cannot meet the 
Other as subject since this would make an object ofthe Other-and it is the 
Otherqua freedom I want (Sartre has this part correct). And in assuming my 
object stale, I deny both the beloved's desire to have me as subjectivity and 
myown being-as-subject. This ontological conflict actually makes a project 
which would be comprehensive of the Other qua person-like-me a pure 
fiction of the imagination; for I only apprehend the Other in her distOlted 
character. That is, her reing is revealed through the filter of my self­
recognition. As a result, all projects towards the Other are fundamentally 
self-oriented projects. A project which is comprehensive of the Other-by 
"comprehensive" we mean a recognition of the Other which is not self­
oriented-is impossible. This is a distressing result of Sartre's ontology. 
Sartre makes reference, quite casually, in his writings to people 
being in love and to friendships. I do not believe that he wants to destroy 
these relations for cynical reasons. His concern is freedom and the 
maintaining of this freedom on an absolute, concrete level. But his 
ontological system has left him no possibility ofthe being-with, and any sort 
of "secure" relation with the Other implies a bad faith move to psychologi­
cally supersede the Oliginal relation of contlict. As he so triumphantly 
declares, it is "useless for human-reality to seek to get out of this dilemma: 
onc must either transcend the Other or allow oneself to be transcended by 
him" (BN: 555). 
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I think one must interpret this challenge as a statement that all 
comprehensive projects towards the Other implicate one in bad faith. Ifthis 
is the case, then the construction of the For-itself-In-itself is the only 
possible recourse in attempting to sunnount the conflict or to escape one's 
gratuitousness because there is "nothing else to do." Thus, Sartre has 
implicitly infected his own system with an insidious disease which is 
constantly undercutting the positive effects of the system. 
If, on the other hand, we want to consider love as a relation with the 
Other which is comprehensive of the Other and not merely a project of self, 
then to fix Sartre's analysis within the framework of being-far-others cannot 
be fruitful. It is necessary t therefore, to establish a concrete relation of 
being-with-others. Since being-far-others considers subject to object rela­
tions, the being-with will involve subject to subject relations, or inter­
subjectivity. The problems which plague the lovers in Sartre's analysis are 
derived from the condition of being-far-others. Iflove can be established on 
grounds different from the for-others. then the same set of problems cannot 
be necessarily involved. 
In Sartre's analysis, the lover desires to appropriate the Othcr qua 
Other to make himself be loved. In other words, the lover wanL..:; the 
beloved's transcendence to be completely occupied in founding him. The 
alternative, inter-subjective account proposes that to the extent thHt the lover 
wants to appropriate the Other's freedom, he wants the Other as a subjectiv­
ity which is looking at an object which is not the lover because then the 
beloved's being is not modified by having to directly apprehend the lover. 
For this to be possible, love must point away from the lovers to what is to be 
fulfilled if the Other loves me: the "making" oflove. A distinct thi rd element 
enters the relation: a common object of transcendence which founds the 
being-with. This third element is not itself contained in the lover's desire for 
the Other, or in the lover's desire to be loved. 
The above requires a distinction between the thematic expression 
oflove-my love for the Other, and my desire to be loved-and the concrete 
experience of love-that which is love per sc and which can be considered 
as Ule criterion by which I know ifthere is anything to support my thcmatized 
desire. If this distinction is not made, then love is either just desire or just 
psychology and the project is without direction. With these two meanings 
of the word "love," one does not have to constantly experience love in order 
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to be in love. It also makes sense to say that there is a difference between 
"loving this person" and "knowing the person you love." The "knowing" 
occurs in the strict relation of being-far-others; but since the relation is 
thematized by love, it directs the lovers to the experience oflove-the mode 
of "being-with." 
In my account, the concrete experience of love comes through 
I 
instances ofinter-subjectivity. This does not imply that the inter-subjective 
experience needs to come prior to the original relation of conflict. Nor does 
it imply that the experience needs to be ofany certain duration (or that it will 
happen at all). But it is the inter-subjective experience which provides the 
objective validity for asserting love thematically. (For the sake of argument, 
assume that the For-itself-In-itselfwas possible to effect~ then, its construc­
tion would be the objective validity for thematic love in Sartre's analysis.) 
The consequence of this thematic/concrete distinction is that love is very 
much a thematic expression. Projects thematized by love bring the lovers 
togetherin pursuing the fulfillment oftheir desire: to experience love inter­
subjectively in the mode ofbeing-with by undertaking a project together. In 
these instances they love the Other qua Other. 
By inter-subjectivity we mean nothing more than the recognition by 
one subjectivity of another subjectivity. In as much as the for-itself is a 
transcending being, this transcendence cannot be directed toward the Other, 
for this will destroy the Other's being-as-subject. Transcendence, for both, 
must be directed towards some common third thing. This means that the 
recognition of the Other qua subject "is effected laterally by a non-thetic 
consciousness" while "a common action or the object of a common percep­
tion" is "explicitly posited" (BN: 535). Direct apprehension ofthe Other's 
freedom is achieved through the self-recognition ofmy object state. So we 
can understand that in the lateral apprehension of the Other's freedom I 
retain my own being-as-subject. 
With inter-subjective love, we escape the acute fear which arises in 
Sartre's analysis because love completely relied on my being-for-the-Other. 
The introduction ofthe third element (which founds the being-with) does not 
require the Other's transcendence to have an ultimate limit by being fixed 
exclusively on me. The instability caused by this impossibility does not 
occur. The Other does not so much choose me as she chooses "to do " 
with me. Though it is the case that the "to do with" often drops out of OUf 
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speaking and explicit awareness, it is nonetheless necessary. There is an 
infinite number of ways that our transcendences can be employed in this 
relation to effect inter-subjectivity. The quality of the inter-subjective 
experience is the motivation for the two people to stay together under the 
thematic expression oflove. It is also the motivation for the splitting apart 
of the lovers-Le., if inter-subjectivity fails to be effected and they are left 
with an empty theme which does not fit their ontological relation ofconflict. 
But this does not at all indicate that love is "destructed" in the sense of a 
structural failure-love either fails to be fulfilled. or it ends. 
Importantly, love is not concretely established within the ontologi­
cal conflict, and. therefore, cannot meet its doom there. The for-others is 
endured under the thematic expression oflove by the lovers as people. Why, 
then, is this employment of a pledge not necessarily dissatisfying? For 
Sartre, the pledge was rejected because it was not a concrete engagement of 
the Other's freedom in the very "stuff' oflove-the ontological conflict. In 
my account, the pledge is not used to supersede a necessary conflict, so it 
does not have the same objectifying and deceptive connotations. Further­
more, a pledge here refers to what can be effected-so it is not, either, 
deceptive by being an empty concept (though it will be dissatisfying if it 
turns out to be empirically empty). 
Thus far we have not said exactly what inter-subjectivity is orhow 
it might be compatible with Sartre's ontology. Sartre admits that the inter­
subjective experience-the experience of a We-is real, but that it is a 
purely psychological phenomenon occurring in a single consciousness. 
Such events do not "appear on the foundation of a concrete ontological 
relation with others"-they are "a question only of a way of feeling myself 
in the midst of others" (BN: 550). Thus it is a simple psychological trick 
in which I reject my own personal ends. It is only a "material channeling of 
my transcendence" (BN: 550). Some might be inclined to accept that we 
at least have, as humans in love, a psychological salve to soften the 
ontological conflict. It can be seen, however, that such a psychological 
answer would most likely be interpreted metaphysically. Few people would 
be satisfied with actually meaning that there is nothing real between them 
when they say "itjust feels right." The psychological answer must be taken 
at its strength-it gives no ontological motive for love, and does not 
diminish Sartre's account in any way. If inter-subjectivity is to be of any 
merit, it must be an ontological structure. 
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Sartre has three key objections to the concrete reality of inter­
subjectivity which I intend to accept as conditions for inter-subjectivity. 
First, he claims that it is strictly dependent "on the various forms of the for­
others," making it "only an empirical enrichment ofcertain of these forms" 
(BN: 553). In accepting this objection, we must admit a sort ofparadox in 
the nature of the being-with. Being-with is nothing more than me, in my 
subject state, being for the Other who is also being forme inher subject state. 
The "distance" ofthe for-others relation allows me to retain comprehension 
ofmy self-ness and the self-ness ofthe Other. The second objection follows 
from the first; Sartre claims that the "subjectivities remain out of reach and 
radically separated" (BN: 550). We want the subjectivities to remain 
separated, for if they were not, we would have only subjectivity and not 
inter-subjectivity. Furthermore, it seems to me that the split is radical only 
in the for-others; in that relation, the subjects suffer their alienated selves 
constituted by the Other's freedom. But in the being-with, the subjects are 
in relation "as themselves" and do not experience their alienated freedom. 
The third objection is that the being-with is dependent upon "particular 
organizations in the midst of the world" for its super-structure and is 
therefore capricious and unstable (BN: 550). We have already accommo­
dated this objection by positing the common object of transcendence; also, 
because of this third element, the inter-subjective experience will be 
"capricious and unstable," but this is no more remarkable than the meta­
stable of the for-itself. 
Keeping these conditions in mind, we need to attempt a character­
ization of the concrete relation of being-with, or inter-subjectivity. To do 
this we will consider a comprehensive look, as it is distinguished from the 
Sartrean look, which is the apprehending of the Other-as-subject through 
one's object state. The nature of the comprehensive look is such that its 
direct focus is a common third element while its lateral, non-thetic aware­
ness is the Other's subjectivity. It should also be noted that the look need 
not be understood only as a look with the eyes; it is the concrete experience 
in which my being, and the being of the Other, are revealed. 
For example, The Other may look at me laterally-she is expecting 
proofofm y subjectivity by my looking back laterally. The explicit object 
of her apprehenSion is some common "event." The Other looks with 
confidence to me. I may have a direct apprehension of the Other's 
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subjectivity through my being-as-object. But the look persists, and inas­
much as I am aware of the third element, I cannot then realize myself as 
object for I feel the Other's transcendence "flowing off' in the direction of 
that something else. I still must choose my attitude in relation to my being­
as-subject-for-the-Other. IfI reject the common object of transcendence, I 
fix my transcendence directly on the Other, who will then have a direct 
apprehension of my subject-state through her being-as-object. Or, I can 
assume my object state by looking away, bringing the Other's look to fall 
directly upon me; this will destroy the structure since the Other needs my 
look for proof ofmy subjectivity: she does not want me as an object, or as 
a subject with a different project. 
The experience is most fleeting when it occurs spontaneously 
without the intentional explicit positing of a third element. Since the third 
element is not explicitly known or recognized, the structure collapses. There 
existed only a trace of a common element, but no actual material condition 
to sustain the structure. Thus we had to fall back on the material conditions 
that did exist-Le., ourselves simply as for-the-Other. Nonetheless, this is 
not simply psychological intentionality, for as long as the minimum neces­
sary material conditions exist-Le., the Other, a trace ofsome third element, 
and myself-the structure can have fleeting life. This indicates that the 
common object of transcendence must be established concretely, and iliat if 
this is not done, only then is the structure psychological-then the subjects 
are not engaging each other as subjectivities, but assuming the Other's 
perspective of the situation. 
In this structure lies the motivation for experiencing love inter­
subjectively. With the "looking away" the beloved and I become transpar­
ent, to be revealed to each other purely in our mutual project. The freedom 
ofthe Otheris not apprehended as opaque over and against my object-state. 
Nor is my freedom apprehended opaquely by an objectification ofthe Other. 
We are not pitted against each other; we are fmally in the mode of being­
with. In this relation, there is a conspicuous lack ofconflict; the metastable 
applies to the structure as a whole, but does not occur within it. 
Ifwe accept this mode of relation, we still need to show why inter­
subjectivity cannot occur on the ground of individual psychology. Sartre. 
cannot admit that the ontological condition does not have the power to 
shatter psychological fabrications; ifhedid, he would not discuss the lovers' 
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"perpetual dissatisfaction:" in essence, his ontology would become purely 
academic. Therefore, if the supposed psychological condition (inter­
subjectivity) exceeds the ontological condition (conflict), then the psycho­
logical situation must still apply in some way to the ontological condition of 
the being-for-others. The only way available to Sartre for making the 
application is bad faith. 
Bad faith involves intentionality; I deny my situation to escape 
responsibility. For example, I can deny that I am my hand on the beloved's 
shoulder so that I do not have to bear the responsibility ofthe consequences 
it might entail. Or, having engaged the beloved in conversation, I can deny 
my transcendence-for cowardly or self-serving reasons-and take on the 
role ofthe lover to become a lover; hence I become a part ofthe deterministic 
world. I amjustified and do not need to take responsibility forhavingchosen 
this Other and this situation. This would amount to my rejectingmy personal 
ends for the ends of this "We." Attitudes ofbad faith are chosen because of 
something; they are chosen for a reason. 
Bad faith, then, cannot apply to the inter-subjective experience, for 
both lovers freel y choose the action-they take responsibility for it. In this 
respect, the experience is not unlike acting independently, except that each 
chooses it in terms ofchoosing itwith the Other-the Other's free choosing 
is expected and apprehended laterally. Is it possible that one might freely 
choose it, but the Other might be "of a different mind"? If this is the case, 
inter-subjectivity fails to happen: one knows the difference, one knows 
when the Other's "heart is not in it" These are concrete events which are 
informative, they are not abstractions. 
Still, might it be the case that the two are in mutual bad faith by both 
claiming their transcendence while denying they are their situation? But 
there is no reason for a denial to occur-there is no reason to deny ei ther their 
facti city or their transcendences. This objection-which I think Sartre 
would confidently employ-stems from an assumption which the lovers did 
not make. If the lovers believed themselves to be "one," then they could act 
in mutual self-deception by denying their factual separateness and claiming 
themselves as their possibilities which are expressed and discovered to be 
the same. This situation is a result of wanting security against the contin­
gencyofthe world-ofwantingto feel themselves to be fated and necessary. 
But this is a psychological contingency which in no way is necessary to the 
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experience of being-with, which presupposes the lovers' factual separate­
ness. 
At this point we should see that if inter-subjectivity is not granted 
on the ground ofa concrete relation ofbeing-with, then any effort to love the 
Other is an attitude of bad faith in which I attempt to take the Other's 
perspective ofthe world and myself. It should be clear, however, that inter­
subjectivity does not involve the lovers' giving up their freedom. Actually. 
the being-with allows the for-itself to retain his being-as-freedom since he 
is not required to assume attitudes of bad faith in relating to the Other. 
My account oflove is not intended to replace Sartre's analysis. but 
to add to it. Sartre's analysis is appropriate for many experiences, and can 
easily be seen as the period of "seduction," or of "trapping" the Other­
though in some muted form, and without the cynical connotation of the 
phrases just spoken. Furthermore, it should be apparent from this discussion 
thatthe being-with is not exclusive ofthe being-for. Without the possibility 
of inter-subjectivity, Sartre's analysis is unable to account for much that 
does occur in the world under the theme ofbeing a comprehensive relation 
with the Other-and I do not find rampant bad faith a suitable answer. 
Nonetheless, my account is not at all meant to exonerate or justify alllhosc 
who claim to be in love. 
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